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The Multilateral System and Free Trade
Agreements: What's the Strategy?
Presentation Summary and Comments
CLAUDE BARFIELD,* Luis DE LA CALLE,** I.M. DESTLER,*** AND REGINA VARGO****
Claude Barfield: While acknowledging that the effectiveness of different negotiating
frameworks varied among individual nations and is best judged empirically, Barfield argued
that the bilateral framework is the least desirable arrangement from the U.S. perspective.
He made three main points: (1) multilateral agreements should remain the priority of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR); (2) it is important in regional agreements to prevent
parties from excluding whole sectors from the agreement; and (3) all nations should commit
to keeping free trade agreements (FTAs) open for other countries to join.
Barfield elaborated that the USTR should favor multilateral agreements because a mul-
tiplicity of bilateral or regional agreements containing many different rules on tariff and
market access would create a politically and economically inefficient world. Plurilateral, or
regional, agreements represent the middle ground on the frameworks spectrum, but suc-
cessful plurilateral agreements (for instance, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
or the moribund Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)) seem unlikely. To date, the
Administration has placed little faith in truly regional agreements, choosing instead bilateral
and trilateral agreements as ways of building toward multilateral agreements. Barfield also
noted one danger in bilateral and regional agreements consists of the possibility that trade
remedies will tilt in favor of those inside the agreement, as evidenced by the U.S. decision
to exempt certain FTA partners from the steel safeguards (announced in March of 2002).
Another danger in regional agreements is that countries will avoid making tough deci-
sions by excluding whole sectors from agreements. For instance, the European Union's
(EU) bilateral FTAs often keep agriculture off the table; Japan's 1999 offer of an FTA with
Korea would have done the same. Barfield suggested two new rules as a method of uniformly
improving negotiation outcomes: (1) require that no tariffs exceed previous levels; and
(2) require that all sectors must be included in final agreements. Toward this end, he
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suggested that countries be required to use the most open market access provided by the
country as a baseline for tariff negotiations and to include at least 95 percent of trade.
Finally, Barfield suggested that all nations should commit to keeping their FTAs open
so that a country would have to negotiate an FTA with any willing country.
Regina Vargo: Vargo argued that the bilateral framework is a crucial component in lib-
eralizing trade, as it represents another level in the "competition of liberalization" tri-
umphed by the current USTR. While free trade agreements proliferated in recent times,
the United States primarily remained a spectator. One hundred ninety FTAs exist world-
wide. The EU has over thirty F'As. Of the thirty FAs involving Western Hemisphere
countries, the United States is a party to only one. In contrast, Mexico has concluded eight
FFAs since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Canada has been
negotiating with several countries in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, while FTAs
traditionally are concluded between countries within a region, FTAs are increasingly used
to solidify and open trade across regions. Recent passage of Trade Promotion Authority
will allow the United States to show more leadership on the trade negotiation front.
The inclusion of bilateral agreements in the negotiating repertoire creates a greater variety
of forums and allows the USTR to pursue innovative provisions and to tailor agreements
to the specific trade and investment context of a country. Strategic thinking can alleviate
the potential weakness of creating bilateral and regional FTAs-incongruent agreements
and piecemeal market access-so that FTAs support larger policy objectives. Ultimately,
the existence and use of different frameworks allows trade liberalization on multiple levels
in an integrated and complementary way.
Luis de la Calle: De la Calle first outlined the advantages of bilateral agreements and then
explained the relationship between the three levels of trade agreements (bilateral, regional,
and multilateral). According to de la Calle, there are three advantages for bilateral agree-
ments: (1) nations engaging in bilateral negotiations are able to think strategically and
choose their partners; (2) nations are able to undertake deeper commitments in bilateral
agreements; and (3) good bilateral agreements can actually promote the multilateral trading
system. For example, in the early 1990s, NAFTA was an important impetus for completing
the Uruguay Round.
Along with the EU, Mexico has the biggest network of free trade agreements. The mul-
titude of agreements translates for Mexico into many stable trading relationships. Addi-
tionally, the web of agreements allows Mexico to be a significant player in various forums-
the WTO, APEC, and FTAA-because it has less to lose than other, less-anchored, nations.
As a reflection of its influence, Mexico is the host of FTAA and APEC discussions.
De la Calle argued that the three levels of trade agreements are inter-linked. Bilateral
free trade agreements can have a significant impact on regional and multilateral negotia-
tions, at least in the short term, because they can change incentives. If the United States
can negotiate with individual Latin American countries, for instance, why would these
countries even want an FTAA? This is true particularly since the FTAA faces two major
challenges as a regional agreement: (1) substantive differences between Latin American
countries, particularly concerning agriculture, that impede the negotiation of the final prod-
uct and (2) difficulties surrounding the negotiation of rules of origin.
With regard to the question of how to reconcile the three levels of negotiations, de la
Calle argued for making the Doha Development Agenda the final frontier. The United
States and the EU should lead the global effort by offering zero import duties for manu-
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facturing products. The lowering of tariffs to zero would eliminate conflicting rules of
origin and present a way by which intrinsic contradictions of doing bilateral, regional, and
multilateral negotiations can be reconciled.
I.M. Destler: The best framework for liberalization, Destler argued, is the global (WTO)
framework. At the same time, however, bilateral and regional free trade agreements tend
to reinforce, not undercut, WTO agreements. The ratification of NAFTA, for example,
created pressure on Europe leading to the Uruguay Round/WVTO agreement. It is clear,
however, that at present the WTO has primacy over the FTAA on agriculture. U.S. farm
interests are reluctant to open domestic markets to Brazilian competitors, until they secure
economically significant concessions from the European Union. In other respects, from the
U.S. perspective, regional agreements offer opportunities for more aggressive liberalization,
particularly when global negotiations stall or will take years to complete. Movement on the
FTAA could provide leverage on different issues, in a manner similar to how NAFTA broke
the ice during the Uruguay Round and offered opportunities to build support for free trade.
Thus, bilateral and regional agreements can produce a constructive dynamic that USTR
Robert Zoellick has called "competitive liberalization."
Questions and Answers: A question relating to article XXIV of the GAT was raised. If
vigorous enforcement is necessary for a strategy of competitive liberalization, does that kind
of enforcement exist today?
Vargo replied that standards in article XXIV are not sufficiently clear to determine con-
sistency of FTAs with the WTO rules. While it is relatively easy to judge when barriers
overall have been raised, it is difficult to determine the exact meaning of "substantially all"
trade. It is unclear what makes an acceptable percentage of liberalization of sectors; should
it, for instance, be 95 percent or 99 percent of all sectors? Further, she stated that "squish-
iness" exists in article XXIV, and it remains unclear how the United States would go about
taking action if certain agreements fundamentally upset U.S. interests.
De La Calle responded that in approaching article XXIV and possible disputes relying
upon it, the United States should defend 'WTO interests, not U.S. interests. Barfield stated
that the United States has maintained a good record of following article XXIV in its own
agreements.
A question was asked regarding the complex politics of agriculture, and whether the
creation of unilateral preferences would facilitate implementation of article XXIV. Destler
asserted that the United States has not behaved consistently on agricultural issues; for
instance, the Administration's flip-flop on the recent farm subsidies bill versus U.S. pressure
on the EU to reform the Common Agricultural Policy. The Administration was unwilling
to confront the clear contradiction in its position for political reasons; it wanted farmers'
votes in the coming election, plus farm representatives' support of Trade Promotion
Authority.
De la Calle added it would be interesting to see how the agricultural issue unfolds in the
NAFTA over the next few years, since NAFTA encompasses the most ambitious agreement
on agriculture to date. Under NAFTA, following January 2003, no duties or quotas will
exist on any agricultural products, except for powdered milk, sugar, and corn.
Regarding article XXIV, Destler stated that fewer and less complex rules of origin would
facilitate free trade, but countries would need to renegotiate and recommit to article XXIV.
Vargo suggested that the establishment of a single rule of origin might disqualify whole
economic sectors from claiming benefits of an agreement and lead to the loss of broad
political support.
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